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Introduction
Currently the City of  Ottawa, like all large Canadian cities, is faced with a dilemma.  The 
increasing costs associated with providing a wide array of  services across a vast geographic 
area necessitates either increasing revenues or cutting services.  While federal and provincial 
downloading in recent years has exacerbated the situation, Canadian cities have long been 
dealing with the inadequacy of  property taxes to fund services that go far beyond the actual 
servicing of  property.  In the absence of  provincial and federal government willingness to 
create a long-term, stable funding arrangement, Canadian municipalities must begin to look 
at more innovative financing mechanisms in order to address their budget shortfalls and 
necessary future expenditures.  This paper will explore two innovative financing tools avail-
able to the City of  Ottawa that are already being practiced by other jurisdictions.  More 
aggressive ‘Financing Growth’ policies and public land banking, are two revenue-generating 
tools that are either underutilized or not employed at all in Ottawa.  Not only does each 
source of  revenue provide desperately needed funds, but they also reduce municipal costs in 
the long-term and further City of  Ottawa economic and environmental planning goals.  
After setting the context of  municipal finances, this paper will explore these two options and 
whether they are feasible in the Ottawa context.     
Context
Since the 1990s, provincial governments have downloaded services to municipalities, includ-
ing social housing, social services, and paramedic services, with little or no added funding.  
As a result, municipalities have been forced to raise property taxes, cut services, increase 
user fees, and experiment with alternate service delivery, none of  which has successfully 
addressed the inherent fiscal problem. Provincial and federal governments have been pro-
vided some funds for projects, but this has been done in an inconsistent and unreliable fash-
ion (Tindal & Tindal, 2004).  Despite some major recent initiatives such as the Gas Tax 
Fund and the Federation of  Canadian Municipalities’ Green Municipal Fund, there re-
mains a real deficit when it comes to upper level municipal grants. The failure to institute 
an adequate and long-term revenue-sharing agreement has led to the current municipal 
fiscal imbalance.  While expensive social services (e.g., affordable housing) may be more 
appropriately funded by higher levels of  government because they entail income redistribu-
tion (Tindal & Tindal, 2004), the current fiscal situation at higher levels means any effort to 
upload services will likely be fruitless.  Some argue for local governments to disentangle 
themselves from providing these services (Vander Ploeg, 2002).  Given their importance 
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however, cities have continued to fund them, primarily through increased user fees and property taxes. 
Property taxes and user fees, however, are both inappropriate and insufficient to meet the needs of  a large growing city.  As Bird and 
Slack (1993) explain, the municipal property tax in particular is widely loathed:
“It has been called inherently regressive, inelastic, and an inadequate generator of  municipal revenues.  It has been labeled ‘unfair’ 
because it is unrelated to ability to pay, ‘unrealistic’ because it is unrelated to benefits, and ‘unsuitable’ because it supports services unrelated 
to property” (100)
Property taxes are particularly ill suited when considering the issue of  urban sprawl. Property owners are typically taxed at the same 
rate across geographic areas, meaning revenues are not based on benefits received.  Suburban communities often pay the same property 
taxes as those living in the inner city, despite consuming more municipal resources.  User fees, although efficient in an economic sense be-
cause they are based on a user pays principle, are not a budgetary panacea, especially considering that they disproportionally affect low-
income residents.  
The municipal fiscal imbalance, inadequacy of  currently employed revenue tools, and mounting responsibilities in the face of  rapid 
growth and climate change raises some serious questions about the future of  municipal financing in Ottawa:  what other avenues for raising 
revenue are available, how are other jurisdictions coping, and are they feasible for the City of  Ottawa?  “With a limited range of  revenue 
sources, many local governments find it difficult to meet their existing obligations, let alone spend their way to environmental sustainability.  
They need a more diverse range of  revenue streams, especially as federal and provincial governments will concentrate in the coming years 
on restoring their own fiscal situation” (Sustainable Prosperity, 2010, 10).  Fortunately, there are proven and viable options for the City of  
Ottawa to pursue.  
Financing Tools
Development Charge Levies and Density-Bonusing
When it comes to using land-use planning and related policy tools to raise funds for city services, Canadian cities have many options: devel-
opment charge levies, density-bonusing, inclusionary zoning, and performance-based planning (CMHC, 2000).  This report, however, will 
focus on development charge levies (DCLs) and a form of  density-bonusing, known as ‘Community Amenity Contributions’ (CACs) and 
discuss how the City of  Ottawa can follow the lead of  the City of  Vancouver’s Financing Growth strategy as well as initiatives in several 
other jurisdictions.  The discussion around these financing tools demonstrate how municipal financing, economic development, planning, 
governance, and community engagement must all function in tandem with one another in order to accomplish municipal goals, raise reve-
nue, reduce strain on municipal coffers, and create an environmentally-sustainable city.  
Generally speaking, development charge levies (DCLs) are fees charged to developers to help pay for growth-related capital costs, a tool 
also known as “pay-as-you-grow” (Skaburskis & Tomalty, 2000).  New development puts additional strain on infrastructure and city services, 
and therefore upward pressure on the primary source of  municipal financing, the property tax.   As a result, cities attempt to recoup some of 
these added costs from the developers—and future residents of  new developments.  Development charges are widely used by Canadian 
municipalities, but the degree to which they are employed varies.  The Development Charges Act, 1997 constrains the use of  DCLs in On-
tario (Government of  Ontario, 2007).  As such, municipalities cannot legally recoup 100% of  growth-related costs through DCLs.  Faced 
with a similar situation, the City of  Vancouver has not only aggressively pursued DCLs as a way of  raising revenue—for example using city-
wide DCLs to construct social housing, child care facilities, and parks in areas outside the neighborhood where fees are initially levied—but 
they have also initiated a type of  mechanism dubbed ‘Community Amenity Contributions (CACs).   
In Vancouver, CACs are implemented as a tool to fill the gaps left by inadequate DCLs (City of  Vancouver, 2009).   Under CACs, the 
City negotiates financial concessions from developers in exchange for allowing increased density (City of  Vancouver, 2011a).  This is akin to 
the practice of  ‘density-bonusing,’ commonly used in larger North American cities, including Toronto (CMHC, 2000).  Concessions can 
include cash, where the city takes a certain percentage of  the profits resulting from the re-zoning, or on-site community amenities.  Interest-
ingly, according to official policy, CACs do not necessarily need to be tied to growth and can also make up for past gaps in services or press-
ing community needs (City of  Vancouver, 2004).  
These two instruments fall under the City of  Vancouver’s official Financing Growth strategy (City of  Vancouver, 2004).  Over the last 
seventeen years, DCLs and CACs have raised hundreds of  millions of  dollars for the City (City of  Vancouver, 2011a, 5), including funds for 
‘hard’ services such as roads, sidewalks, and transit, as well as ‘soft’ services, such as child-care, affordable housing, and elderly care.  The 
City aggressively uses these instruments in order to raise revenue, as well as to maintain and improve its physical and social infrastructure.  
Financing Growth strategies are a step towards not only full financial cost recovery but also towards internalizing some of  the social costs of 
urban growth.  This is in line with the recommendations of  many municipal affairs commentators as well as the principles of  ‘environ-
mental pricing reforms’ (Sustainable Prosperity, 2010). 
Many have argued that local governments fail to synergize their development levy charges with their overall planning goals (Tindal & 
Tindal, 2004; Tomalty & Skaburskis, 2003; Slack, 2002; Skaburskis & Tomalty, 2000).  “Despite the evidence of  significant repercussions on 
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development patters, development charges have not been designed either to minimize the negative aspects of  those repercussions from a 
planning point of  view or to exploit their positive potential to reinforce planning goals” (Tomalty & Skaburskis, 2003, 156).  A crucial aspect 
of  DCLs and CACs is making sure they are geographically differentiated.  This means that inner-city levies should be reduced and subur-
ban levies raised.  “Uniform development charges across a municipality, as is often found, subsidizes inefficient uses of  land and can con-
tributed to urban sprawl”  (Tindal & Tindal, 2004, 235).  
Urban sprawl has many negative externalities, highlighted by increased infrastructure costs from extending city services such as water, 
sewer and roads, increased commute times leading to congestion, pollution, and reduced green space, farmland, and ecosystems.  Market 
failures mean that developers and residents in outlying areas do not pay the full social cost of  sprawl—congestion, pollution, road construc-
tion, loss of  ecosystems and farmland are not priced into the private cost of  suburban settlement.  As such, it is in the best interest of  mu-
nicipalities to attempt to not only reduce urban sprawl through urban planning, but also to use levers such as development charges as 
mechanisms to raise revenue and correct price signals.  At the same time, higher density urban development costs municipalities less, be-
cause provision of  services is much more economically efficient (Essiambre-Phillips-Desjardins, 1995).  Therefore a Financing Growth pol-
icy that encourages higher density housing while raising revenue is a win-win situation for cities.
Ottawa is an excellent example of  the failure to coordinate land-use planning and financial levers.  The continued expansion of  sub-
urbs, helped by City Council’s failure over the last two decades to hold the line on extension of  the urban boundary, has strained service 
provision and put Ottawa on an unsustainable path.  It is crucial to note that better long-term planning and implementation of  these Fi-
nancing Growth policies will save money in the future and boost current revenues for spending on both core and social services.  The City 
already uses some planning tools, such as ‘cash in lieu’ of  parking or green space (CBC News, 2011), however taking a more activist ap-
proach in their DCL policy and using CACs would raise added revenue and be a much more effective way at accomplishing their social, 
environmental, and economic development goals.
Unfortunately, provincial legislation in Ontario the form of  the Development Charges Act, 1997 (DCA) constrains the use of  DCLs 
throughout the province.  Limits are set on the amount municipalities can charge, as well as on the type of  services they can be used to fund 
(Slack, 2002).  Revenue raised from DCLs, for example, cannot be used to finance several municipal services such as parkland acquisition, 
museums, or galleries (Government of  Ontario, 2007).  In addition, the DCLs are calculated based on the average level of  service of  that 
area over ten years.  Previously, the bar was set at the highest level of  service achieved over ten years.  Many of  these changes came about as 
a result of  lobbying by the development industry, who argued for stricter controls over DCLs (Slack, 2002).  However, the DCA does permit 
DCL funding of  many crucial services, including affordable housing, child care, parks development, and public transit.  Density-bonusing is 
also enabled by provincial legislation in Ontario (CMHC, 2000, 3), however the City of  Ottawa has not embraced such a practice.  Despite 
the restrictions placed by the DCA, the City can play a much more assertive role within the existing legislative context.  
The City of  Ottawa’s Official Plan calls for higher-density development, particularly inside the Greenbelt (City of  Ottawa, 2007).  In 
order to meet this goal, the City could be strategic in its application of  more aggressive DCLs and density-bonusing.  Following the lead of  
other jurisdictions, such as Kelowna or Kitchener, Ottawa could rebate or eliminate DCLs for certain areas where they are attempting to 
encourage infill or higher densities.  In Kitchener, DCLs are 66% higher for suburban developments (City of  Kitchener, 2010).   Although 
the City of  Ottawa’s DCLs are also set higher for suburban development (City of  Ottawa, 2011), given the spatial dimensions of  Ottawa’s 
peripheral development—immense area with suburbs located further from the core than most large cities—the fees are clearly not high 
enough to discourage urban sprawl or cover municipal costs.  Likewise, the discrepancy between fees for development inside and outside the 
Greenbelt is not substantial enough to encourage higher density development.  Higher-density development is also discouraged when DCLs 
are charged on a per unit basis without regard to the building’s characteristics (Skaburskis & Tomalty, 2000).  In Ottawa, the City does dif-
ferentiate DCLs between multi-unit and single-unit dwellings (City of  Ottawa, 2011), but fails to differentiate any further.  As such, DCLs 
are the same per unit regardless of  whether a building contains one hundred units or three.  As a result of  this, the City has one of  the 
highest DCLs for apartment housing in the country (CMHC, 2002, 4).  To remedy this, the City of  Ottawa should follow the lead of  the 
City of  Kelowna, where a density gradient approach is taken—fee schedules decrease as the number of  units per dwelling increases (City of 
Kelowna, 2007).    
Perhaps the most significant barrier to implementing Financing Growth policies, is opposition from private sector developers.  In 
Kelowna, developer resistance to their new DCLs resulted in a compromised reduced fee for low-density, peripheral construction (Tomalty, 
2007, 24).  Concern over higher-priced, single-family suburban dwellings has been identified as the main barrier to implementing this type 
of  policy in Ontario (Tomalty, 2007; Slack, 2002).  Of  course, more differentiated DCLs will open up new development opportunities inside 
the Greenbelt in Ottawa.  Similarly, CACs yield profit for developers and municipalities, as a result of  re-zoning, and therefore is mutually 
beneficial.  The overall application of  these policies will need to be done gradually to ensure an orderly and economically feasible transition.  
There are also important concerns about the ‘deal-making’ between city officials and developers that occurs as a result of  these poli-
cies.  When DCLs are negotiated on a case-by-case basis, as is done in some jurisdictions, for example the UK (Henneberry & Goodchild, 
1996), it creates an administrative, political, and project-budgeting headache.  As Clinch and O’Neill (2010) point out, the negotiation proc-
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ess may be subject to political manipulation.  To ensure transparency and avoid the perception of  favoritism, a formalized set of  guidelines 
that dictate levels of  DCLs will be crucial.  Once carefully set, fee schedules must not be oft changed or negotiated ad hoc, with exceptions 
for projects that involve social services such as affordable housing.   This will also provide stability for developers to budget their projects.  As 
Henneberry & Goodchild (1996) conclude, formalized DCLs are advantageous because they provide clarity, certainty, and equity.  CACs, 
on the other hand, are inherently flexible in their application and use, and involve even more negotiation with the private sector.  In this 
case, all re-zoning applications must be put before council, and given due process, including community consultation.
Community acceptance has been identified as a key condition for the success of  density-bonusing in particular.  As a result, imple-
menting CACs works best in neighborhoods that are already relatively dense or have experienced rapid growth.  In areas undergoing the 
transition from lower to higher densities, Financing Growth policies must be carried out diligently and with meaningful and constructive 
negotiation with residents.  Recently in Ottawa, higher-density development has ignited a political and public debate.  While the City of  
Ottawa official plan calls for intensification, many are upset over the pace of  development, the changing ‘character’ of  their neighbour-
hood.  Framing this debate is an oft-expressed criticism of  the perceived cozy relationship between the City and developers.  Using policy 
levers such as CACs, however, which trade-off  increased density for community amenities, would be a big improvement of  the current 
situation.  It is common practice in Ottawa to re-zone properties without any concession (Ottawa Citizen, 2011).  A successful density-
bonusing program in Ottawa would necessitate much better consultation with affected residents, but added community amenities could 
help build community support for higher density projects.
Land Banking
Development charge levies and community amenity contributions are both viable financing and planning tools for the City of  Ottawa.  On 
top of  this, there is a similar mechanism that raises funds and can promote more socially efficient form of  development.  Land banking, 
though less studied and discussed in the literature, is an old technique that remains as viable today as ever, even in the Canadian context.  
Public land banking is defined as “the process by which a government authority assembles land, usually on the periphery of  an urban cen-
ter, with a view to selling it for development at some future date” (Stoebuck, 1986).  At the same time, instead of  selling land off  directly, 
local governments can keep land and use it for other purposes, for example development of  social housing, or even leasing it out for com-
mercial space.  
Land banking is typically a longer-term process, with governments typically waiting around five to ten years before selling or develop-
ing it (Stoebuck, 1986).  While it can be used to generate profits for local authorities, it can also be used as a planning tool.  Municipalities 
have the choice between reselling land for the most profit, or they can leverage the land to encourage a certain type of  development that 
might better align with municipal priorities, for example higher density, mixed-use development, social housing, or community facilities.  
Similar to Financing Growth policies, land banking not only raises revenue, but also can be exploited to exact concessions from developers 
in order to further social, environmental, or economic goals.  
Public land banking is popular throughout the world, including the U.S., and is currently practiced by several small to mid-sized mu-
nicipalities in Western Canada, highlighted by the City of  Saskatoon, who operate the largest self-financed land bank in Canada.  In opera-
tion since the end of  WWI, the Saskatoon Land Bank has successfully raised funds and shaped urban growth.  It is worth noting that some 
larger cities engage in the process of  land banking tacitly through their property acquisition, planning, and development activities.  The 
City of  Vancouver actively acquires properties for medium to long-term strategic purposes, but they do not operate an explicit ‘land bank 
program’ in the same way that other cities do.  
Initially land banks were created partly as a way to ensure a continuous supply of  cheap land for residential and industrial develop-
ment (McFayden, 1978; Carr & Smith, 1975).  Today, however, these tools are used in a more progressive revenue-raising and planning-
oriented approach.  The mandate of  Saskatoon’s program is to provide an adequate supply of  serviced land, initiate creativity and innova-
tion in urban design, yield profits to be allocated to civic projects and programs, and manage urban sprawl (City of  Saskatoon, 2011).   The 
City of  Saskatoon strategically purchases and sells many residential, commercial, and industrial zoned properties each year.  This program 
is entirely self-financed because of  its sound business model.  Revenues from land sales flow into a large reserve fund, where it can be used 
to purchase additional land. 
Millions of  dollars of  profits, accumulated interest, and revenue generated from leases, however, flows directly into general municipal 
capital and operating budgets (FCM, 2011).   This means that every year, the land bank helps finance a variety of  crucial municipal serv-
ices, including affordable housing, operating budgets, urban renewal, and various capital projects.  As a result, Saskatoon relies less on its 
property tax base, and subsequently is able to keep taxes stable and create better conditions for economic development and growth, which 
in turn ensures the long-term success of  the land bank program.   Some municipalities have looked to Saskatoon as a model of  sustainable 
economic and municipal financing practice, and Ottawa would benefit from following their lead.   
Under provincial legislation in Ontario, land banking is currently permitted and has been used in the past (City of  Kingston, 2004).  
Ottawa’s vast area and the abundance of  greenfield, brownfield, and underutilized lots both inside and outside the Greenbelt—for example 
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parking lots, vacant buildings, and an annually-replenished stock of  properties delinquent on their tax bills—mean there is significant poten-
tial to pursue this type of  initiative.  Economic and population growth in Ottawa mean conditions are suitable for long-term municipal land 
banking.  With this type of  program, the City can ensure their land acquisitions turn out to be ‘smart’ buys, because land banks work in 
tandem with city officials in planning and zoning, to add valued to the land, through re-zoning or servicing (Carr & Smith, 1975).  As such, 
the City can strategically raise the value of  certain land, yielding profits once it is sold.  At the same time, City of  Ottawa land banking and 
strategic development activities could employ partnerships with the National Capital Commission (NCC).  Given their prominent landhold-
ings and political clout in the region, the NCC would be a valuable partner and must be engaged in this particular policy.  
This type of  policy requires council initiative to establish a land bank, but ongoing proper management requires long-term vision and 
sound fiscal judgment.  Learning from Saskatoon, it would be wise to establish a land bank program under a governance structure that 
places most decisions at arms length from city council, similar to the provision of  social housing through Ottawa Community Housing.  
This way, council could provide a mandate and strategic direction, but leave some management decisions immune to political manipulation.  
Accountability could be maintained through a committee comprised of  councilors, experts, and stakeholders.  Like DCLs and CACs, the 
process of  buying, selling, and using land as leverage in strategic development involves negotiations with various actors in the private sector.  
Therefore, to assuage the concerns around backroom ‘deal-making,’ major transaction should be subject to committee or council approval.   
Conclusion
While pressing urban issues go unreported and are ignored by academia and upper level governments alike, known in some circles as a 
policy ‘black hole’ (Eidelman & Taylor, 2010), cities like Ottawa must begin to be more aggressive in leveraging their options.  The City of  
Ottawa’s lack of  interest in fully exploiting financial levers is possibly due to their reluctance to face not only the potential political backlash 
from developers, but also the accountability entailed by asserting themselves.  As Siegel points out, many Canadian cities hesitate to raise 
revenue or exercise newly granted powers because of  the responsibility that comes along with financial and legislative authority.  Neverthe-
less, Ottawa must meet their challenges with ingenuity and capital pride, similar to what transpired in Ottawa’s post-war development, due 
mainly to the initiative of  the National Capital Commission (Gordon & Seasons, 2009).  
Aggressive development charge levies and community amenity contributions have already been successfully applied in other Canadian 
municipalities.  As part of  the environmental pricing reform movement, they are a step towards internalizing externalities of  growth, and 
could be a possible stepping-stone towards other related policies, such as road pricing.  Public and banking is another approach and has a 
long history of  success in Canada.  By following the lead of  cities like Saskatoon, Ottawa could employ this technique to raise funds and 
manage growth across their vast geographic area.  Of  course, all of  these policies must be diligently implemented.  As Kirwan (1988) con-
cludes, “legally, politically, and socially new methods of  financing … will be acceptable only if  the nexus [between development and im-
proved social capital formation] is clear and if  the system for the apportionment of  costs is equitable” (299).  Financing growth policies and 
land banking are two innovative financial options available to the City of  Ottawa that successfully navigate the nexus between municipal 
finance, long-term sustainability planning, economic development, and provision of  hard and soft services.  Only by thinking out of  the 
box, will Ottawa ease its reliance on the property tax and achieve its long-term, lofty goals.
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